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Friedman: Corporations - The Business Judgment Rule Shields the Good Faith

CORPORATIONS-THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE SHIELDS THE GOOD
FAITH DECISION OF DISINTERESTED DIRECTORS TO TERMINATE A DERIVATIVE SUIT AGAINST THE CORPORATION'S DIRECTORS.

Auerbach v. Bennett (N.Y. 1979)
In 1976, Elias Auerbach, a shareholder of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation (GTE), instituted a derivative suit on behalf of GTE'
alleging that the corporation's directors 2 and auditors, Arthur Andersen &
Co., were liable to GTE for breach of their fiduciary duties to the corporation in connection with bribes and kickbacks paid in the United States and
abroad by GTE or its subsidiaries. 3 In response to the suit, GTE's board of
directors appointed a special litigation committee consisting of three directors who had joined the board after the challenged payments had been
made. 4 After the committee concluded that it was not in GTE's best in-

1. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 625, 393 N.E.2d 994, 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923
(1979). In the summer of 1975, GTE's management, prompted by reports that numerous multinational companies had made questionable payments to foreign officials, instituted an investigation to determine if GTE had made similar payments. Id. at 624, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 922. The results of the investigation were made known to the board of directors
who referred the matter to the board's audit committee. Id. The audit committee, with the help
of Arthur Andersen & Co., GTE's outside auditor, sought to discover whether corporate funds
had been used "to pay any political party or person or ... any officer, employee, shareholder
or director of any governmental or private customer." Id. The audit committee found evidence
that, in the period from 1971 to 1975, GTE or its subsidiaries had made payments constituting
bribes, possibly totaling over $11 million. Id. at 624, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
The audit committee's report, contained in a proxy statement issued before the April, 1976
annual shareholders' meeting, prompted this suit. Id.
2. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923. The plaintiff agreed not to serve
nine of the directors who were named as defendants unless and until their involvement in the
actions became apparent. Id. at 625 n.2, 393 N.E.2d at 997 n.2, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923 n.2.
3. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923. The complaint alleged two causes of
action: 1) that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by permitting the payments to be
made and by failing to act to recover them; and 2) that the auditor was negligent in failing to
discover and report the payments. Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d 98, 102 n.1, 408 N.Y.S.2d
83, 84 n.1 (1978), rev'd, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
4. 47 N.Y.2d at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923. The three directors were
Howard Blauvelt, chairman of the board of Continental Oil Company; Dr. John T. Dunlop,
Lamont University Professor at the Graduate School of Business Administration of Harvard
University; and James R. Barker, chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Moore
McCormack Resources, Inc. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. None of the
three had any prior affiliation with GTE. Id. at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
The committee was vested with "all of the authority of the Board of Directors to determine, on
behalf of the Board, the position that the Corporation shall take with respect to the derivative
claims alleged on its behalf." Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923, quoting
Resolution of GTE's Board of Directors (April 21, 1976). For a discussion of the significance of
this delegation of authority, see note 29 and accompanying text infra.

(551)
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terests to prosecute the actions, the defendants moved for and were granted
6
summary judgment.
When Auerbach failed to appeal the trial court's grant of summary
judgment, Stanley Wallenstein attempted to intervene nunc pro tunc to pursue an appeal. 7 The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, allowed the intervenor to appeal, and reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 8 This decision was appealed by the defendants to the New
York Court of Appeals which modified the order of the Appellate Division
and reinstated the grant of summary judgment, 9 holding that the committee's decision not to continue the suit was shielded from judicial scrutiny by
the business judgment doctrine. 10 Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
5. 47 N.Y.2d at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923. In support of its conclusion, the committee stated that the named directors had not violated New York's statutory
standard of care, nor had they personally profited in any way. Id. at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 997,
419 N.Y.S. at 923. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1979) (requiring directors
to exercise the care of an "ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances"). The committee further noted that if the actions were pursued, the following outcome could be expected:
1) the time and talent of senior management would be wasted in pretrial and trial proceedings;
2) the costs of litigation would be too high in view of the likelihood of success; and 3) the
continuing publicity caused by the trial could be damaging to the corporation's business. 47
N.Y.2d at 625-26, 393 N.E.2d at 997, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
6. 47 N.Y.2d at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 997-98, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
7. Id. at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 924. The original plaintiff, Auerbach,
had refused to appeal the order of the trial court even when requested to do so by Wallenstein.
64 A.D.2d at 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85. Wallenstein, as executor of the estate of a deceased GTE
shareholder, filed a "Notice of Appeal" from the order of the trial court, thereby prompting the
defendants to move for dismissal on the ground that Wallenstein was not an aggrieved party
within the meaning of rule 5511 of the New York Rules of Civil Procedure. 47 N.Y.2d at 626,
393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 5511 (McKinney 1978);
note 34 infra. In response to the defendant's motion, Wallenstein filed his motion to intervene
nunc pro tunc, arguing that he was an "aggrieved party" since when he had initiated his own
derivative suit, the defendants had moved to dismiss it on the ground that the lower court's
order and judgment in the instant case (which was instituted before Wallenstein's) constituted
res judicata and resulted in collateral estoppel. 47 N.Y.2d at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 924. See note 34 infra.
8. 47 N.Y.2d at 627, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 924. Relying upon the Second
Circuit's decision in Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), revd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979),
the Appellate Division held that a nonfrivolous derivative suit should not be terminated by
summary judgment before pretrial discovery. 64 A.D.2d at 107-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88, citing
Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), revd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). The defendants
contended that Lasker was distinguishable from the case at bar because federal law governed
the duties owed by the directors in Lasker, whereas New York law applied in the instant case.
64 A.D.2d at 108 n.6, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88 n.6. Justice Hopkins, however, writing for the Appellate Division in Auerbach, did not believe that the fiduciary duties owed under New York law
differed from the duties owed under federal law. Id. The Appellate Division held that summary
judgment would be appropriate only when discovery showed that the committee members were
disinterested. Id. For a discussion of Lasker, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
9. 47 N.Y.2d at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930. Finding no evidence on the
record below that discovery would be anything more than a "fishing expedition," the court
rejected Wallenstein's request that summary judgment be withheld pending full civil discovery.
Id. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930. For a discussion of the significance of
the scope of discovery, see note 8 supra; notes 52-53 & 67-71 and accompanying text infra.
10. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court also held that
judicial inquiry into the "disinterested" status of the directors on a special litigation committee
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One of the basic principles of the corporate system is that the corporation is managed by, and acts through, its board of directors. 1 This author12
ity enjoyed by directors is protected by the business judgment doctrine,
which was summarized in Pollitz v. Wabash Railroad: 13
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate
funds to advance corporate interests, are left solely to [the directors'] honest and unselfish decision, for their powers therein are
without limitation and free from restraint, and the exercise of them
for the common and general interests of the corporation may not
be questioned, although the results show that what they did was
unwise or inexpedient.14
The business judgment rule also protects, from judicial intervention, the
directors' decisions concerning whether or not to pursue a cause of action
belonging to the corporation. 15 Justice Brandeis explained that "[w]hether
or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for
damages is, like other business questions, ordinarily a matter of internal
management and is left to the discretion of the directors." 16
is never foreclosed, nor is an evaluation of their methods in determining whether or not to
proceed with the derivative suit. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. See text
accompanying note 38 infra. Absent evidence of bad faith, however, the court maintained that
it cannot inquire into the weight which the committee accorded the various factors it considered
in arriving at its decision, 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. See note
63 and accompanying text infra.
11. See H. HENN, LAw OF CORPORATIONS 415 (1970). See also DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 8, §

141(a) (Supp. 1978).
12. In essence, the business judgment doctrine forbids the courts from inquiring into the
soundness of the good faith decisions of corporate officers and directors concerning management
of the corporation. See Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124, 100 N.E. 721, 724 (1912);
Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule as a Guide for Judicial Restraint,
35 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 562 (1967). The rule is stated with slight variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and is closely entwined with the duty of care owed by directors to the
corporation and its shareholders. ld. at 562-63. The relationship between the directors' duty to
act with due care and the business judgment rule was articulated by a New York court as
follows:
When courts say that they will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed that judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised. A director
cannot close his eves to what is going on about him .. . and have it said that he is
exercising business judgment. Courts have properly decided to give directors a wide
latitude in the management of the affairs of a corporation provided always that judgment,
and that means an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them.
Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (citations omitted).
13. 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912).
14. Id. at 124, 100 N.E. at 724.
15. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The Gall court observed:
"Since it is the interests of the corporation which are at stake, it is the responsibility of the
directors of the corporation to determine, in the first instance, whether an action should be
brought on the corporation's behalf." Id.See also Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co.,
187 U.S. 455 (1903); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881); Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517
F.2d 932 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 11 N.E.2d 883
(1937).
16. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917). Justice
Brandeis qualified his statement by noting that the court can interfere "where the directors are

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

3

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 7
VILLANOVTA LAWv REVIE\V

[Vol. 25: p. 551

Situations may arise in which, for some reason, the directors will not
enforce a right of the corporation. If this occurs, a shareholder of the corporation may be permitted to sue on behalf of the corporation through the
use of a derivative action. 17 Since the directors are charged with the responsibility of managing the corporation, many states require as a prerequisite to bringing a derivative action that the plaintiff-stockholder request the directors to initiate the legal action.18 This demand requirement
has been held to be a substantive right of the directors 19 which enables
disinterested board members, who act in good faith and in the absence of
fraud or corruption, to use their sound "business judgment" to decide
whether or not it is in the corporation's best interests to pursue the cause of
action.

20

Problems arise, however, when the derivative suit is against a majority
of the directors. When such a suit is brought, courts generally will not con-

guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation
which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgement." Id. at 264.
17. See Dykstra, The Revival oJ the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 97 (1967). It is
generally agreed that, although derivative actions are "an awkward, costly, and intricate
mechanism," they continue to be an effective regulator of corporate management. Id. at 81.
Professor Dykstra points out that, because there is an increasing division between ownership
and control of the corporation, a method of vigilance-i.e., the derivative suit-is necessary to
force an accounting by those who control to those who own. Id.
justice Jackson, writing fbr the United States Supreme Court over thirty years ago, noted
that this equitable remedy was subject to abuse by those who would essentially blackmail management in order to gain at least a settlement in a suit brought for its nuisance value. Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Such abuse often produced a secret settlement paid by the corporation. Id. Thus, any actual wrongs to the corporation not only escaped
judicial notice, but were actually compounded by these so-called "strike-suits." Id.
In an effort to discourage frivolous derivative suits, many states have enacted statutes which
require that security for costs be posted by the plaintiff. See Dykstra, supra, at 88. This requirement has not, however, been judicially construed so as to accomplish its goal. See DeCapriles, Fifteen-Year Survey of Corporate Developments, 1944-1959, 13 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-16
(1959). For example, the New York statute requires that security for costs be posted if the
plaintiff-shareholder owns less than five percent of the outstanding stock and if his stock has a
market value of less than $50,000. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1979). The
legislative intent was apparently thwarted, however, when the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that shareholders could compel disclosure of stockholder lists in order to seek others to
join as plaintiffs and, thus aggregately satisfy the statute's threshold requirements. See Baker v.
MacFadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950).
18.. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(2) (West 1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 626(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1979). Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains a typical
demand requirement, providing in pertinent part: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors
. . . and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1.
19. See In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973), citing Bartlett v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 221 Mass. 530, 538, 109 N.E.
452, 456 (1915).
20. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917); Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 462 (1903); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1881); Brody v. Chemical Bank, 517 F.2d 932, 934 (2d Cir. 1975)
(per curiamn); In re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973); Ash v. IBM, Inc., 353 F.2d 491, 492-93 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
927 (1966); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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strain themselves with a rigid application of the business judgment rule. 21
Moreover, the demand requirement is generally excused in such a case since
it is assumed that the demand would be futile 22 -the theory being that the
directors would never elect to sue themselves. 23 When, however, a minority of the board is accused of wrongdoing and it is demonstrated that the
majority was honest and did not participate in the challenged activity, the
decision of the directors to terminate the derivative suit has been protected
24
by the business judgment doctrine.

21. See Note, supra note 12, at 562.
22. See In re Kauffman Mut. Funds, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1973); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 19, 99 N.E. 138, 142 (1912); Ripley v.
International Rys. of Cent. America, 8 A.D.2d 310, 317-18, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1959), affd, 8
N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960); Note, Demand on Directors and
Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 753-54 (1960). See
also notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra.
23. See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Continental
Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912); Barr v. Wackman, 43 A.D.2d 689, 350
N.Y.S.2d 428 (1973) (per curiain), aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329 NE.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
In Barr, a shareholder accused the majority of the directors of a target company of, inter alia,
approving a tender offer for personal gain, approving improvident employment contracts of fellow directors, and changing the terms of a merger proposal to the detriment of the corporation.
36 N.Y.2d at 375-76, 329 N.E.2d at 184, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the trial court was justified in excusing the demand requirement. Id. at 381,
329 N.E.2d at 188, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 508. See also Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America,
8 A.D.2d 310, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62 (1959), aff'd, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289
(1960); Steinberg v. Altschuler, 158 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 1956). The Barr exception to the
demand requirement may no longer be available in light of the holding in the instant case. See
notes 77-81 and accompanying text infra.
There is also support for the proposition that no demand need be made if the directors and
stockholders would be unable to ratify the wrongdoing. See Rogers v. American Can Co., 305
F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1962) (antitrust violation); Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458
(Sup. Ct. 1958) (fraud); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912)
(fraudulent issuance of stock); Note, supra note 22 at 762. But see United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 264 (1917) (failure to allege wrongdoers controlled the
corporation was fatal to derivative suit based on alleged antitrust violations); Ash v. IBM, Inc.,
353 F.2d 491, 492 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966) (no evidence that honest
business judgment was not used in authorizing arguably nonratifiable acquisition of assets);
Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (use of business judgment not equivalent to ratification where Federal Investment Company Act has allegedly been violated); S. Soloment & Sons Trust, Inc. v.
New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 113-14, 93 N.E.2d 241, 248 (1950)
(stockholder ratification of directors' actions valid since stockholders were disinterested).
24. See, e.g., In re Kauffman Mut. Funds Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973); Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854 (7th Cir. 1957); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F.
Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966).
In Swanson, a minority of the board of directors were accused of fraudulent conspiracy. 249
F.2d at 856 n.I. The court found that a majority of the board was honest and not under the
influence or control of the minority; therefore, the majority could, by exercising its business
judgment, terminate the suit against the minority directors. Id. at 858-60.
Similarly, in Issner, two corporations created a jointly owned subsidiary and approved an
allegedly unfair contract between the subsidiary and one of the joint owners. 254 F. Supp. at
698. Three of the directors of the corporation which received the favorable contract were also
directors of the other joint owner, albeit a small minority of the entire board. Id. at 699. The
plaintiff, who filed a derivative suit on behalf of the allegedly disfavored joint owner, was unable
to disprove the likelihood that the corporation which received the favorable contract did so
because of its superior bargaining position. Id. at 701. Therefore, the court held that the plain-
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Over the last few years, in an effort to revitalize the business judgment
rule when a majority of the directors is implicated, a technique has been
developed whereby an accused majority of the board elects a committee of
disinterested directors to decide for the board whether the corporation
should pursue the derivative action against the directors.2 5 This technique
was approved by the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Gall v. Exxon Corp.,26 where a majority of the board of
directors was accused of bribery.2 7 The court concluded that, since the
three directors appointed by the full board were disinterested, they could
terminate a derivative suit if they concluded that it was in the corporation's
best interests not to sue.2 8 According to the court, the three directors were
vested with the full authority of the board to decide what action the corpora29
tion should take.

tiff had failed to establish that a majority of the directors "participated in a Faud," and the
board majority was thus permitted to terminate the derivative suit. Id. at 701-02.
Two other cases worthy of note are Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658
(S.D. N.Y. 1977), and Gilbertv. Curtiss-\Vright Corp., 179 Misc. 64t, 38 N.Y. S.21548(Sup. Ct. 1942).
The Beasley court, in approving a settlement of several derivative actions, rejected claims that
the directors' approval of the proposed settlement was improper since some board members
were named as defendants. 73 F.R.D. at 664-66, 667-69. The fact that no defendant personally
profited from the alleged mismanagement of funds, and'that special counsel and outside, disinterested directors approved the plans as well, convinced the court that the business judgment
rule should apply. Id. at 668-69.
Similar deference was given to the majority of disinterested directors in Gilbert, where
plaintiffs sought to compel the defendant directors to reimburse the corporation for fees incurred when they caused the corporation to plead guilty to a violation of a federal embargo. 179
Misc. at 643, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 550-51. The court held that, absent other proof that sound business judgment had not been exercised in refusing to press claims against the two directors who
had pleaded guilty (and who had caused the violation), no bad faith on the part of all the directors can be inferred merely from the guilty pleas of two of the directors. Id. at 643-44, 38
N.Y.S.2d at 551. The guilty pleas bound only those directors who had so pleaded, and, absent
independent proof of the guilt of the other directors, their decision not to pursue the claims was
final. Id. at 645, 38 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
25. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Lasker v. Burks, 404
F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
26. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
27. Id.at 509.
28. Id. at 516-19. It should be noted that when the board's failure to sue is itself illegal,
neither the board nor a disinterested committee thereof could legally terminate the derivative
suit. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974). In Miller, the Third
Circuit, applying New York law, found that failure to bring suit for a debt owed to the corporation by the Democratic National Committee constituted an illegal campaign contribution. 1d. at
761, 765. Accordingly, the court held that the directors' decision not to sue was unprotected by
the business judgment rule. id. at 762. The court in Gall distinguished Miller on the ground
that the refusal to sue the directors for prior actions in Gall was not itself an illegal act, nor did
it perpetuate an illegal act. 418 F. Supp. at 518 n. 19. For a discussion of the potential impact of
Miller, see note 82 infra.
29. 418 F. Supp. at 517. The bylaws of the corporation, in accordance with a New Jersey
statute, required an executive committee of at least three directors and provided that "each
such committee shall have and may exercise all the authority of the board." Id. at 510 ni.. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: 6-9 (West 1969). The plaintiff argued that the full board, including
the interested directors, had the power to overrule any decision made by the executive committee, and, therefore, the committee's decision not to sue was not made independently of the
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In Lasker v. Burks, 30 the same district court that decided Gall again
permitted a committee of "disinterested" directors, who were appointed by
31
an interested majority, to terminate a derivative suit against the board.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that federal
law governed the fiduciary duties of the directors and that, under federal
law, this technique could not be used to terminate a nonfrivolous derivative
suit. 32 The United States Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that
state law applied because Congress did not intend the federal statute, which
the directors allegedly violated, to create federal standards governing the
33
directors' fiduciary duties.
Against this background, the Auerbach court began its analysis 34 by
acknowledging that it was precluded from inquiring into good faith actions of

defendant directors. 418 F. Supp. at 517. The court rejected this contention, however, finding
that the statute placed the committee's decision beyond the control of the board. Id. Nevertheless, the court withheld a grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment pending discovery because the plaintiff alleged that the committee may have been involved or interested in
the wrongdoing. Id. at 519-20.
30, 404 F. Supp. 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), revd, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441
U.S. 471 (1979).
31. Id. at 1180. The district court in Lasker, unlike the Auerbach court, examined the
factors which the committee weighed in making its decision and, upon concluding that they
were sufficient to enable an informed decision, permitted discovery as to the good faith of the
directors. Id. at 1181. See notes 45-47 & 69-71 and accompanying text infra. It is also worth
noting that in Lasker, Gall and Auerbach, the disinterested directors received the advice of former
chief jurists from either the New York Court of Appeals or the New Jersey Supreme Court, who
acted as special counsel. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d at 1210; Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F.
Supp. at 514 n.12; Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d at 102, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
32. 567 F.2d at 1212.
33. 441 U.S. at 486. The directors were accused of, inter alia, violating the Investment
Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), and the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a13(a)(3), 36 (1976). 567 F.2d at 1209.
34. Before reaching the merits, the court disposed of the procedural issue of whether intervention was properly permitted by the court below. 47 N.Y.2d at 627, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 924. The court agreed with the lower court's holding that "when a stockholder
undertakes to sue on behalf of the corporation, his action concerns other stockholders as well."
Id., quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d at 104, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86. Thus, the court held
that because a dismissal on the merits of one derivative suit bars suits by other shareholders on
the same cause of action, the intervenor here was clearly an "aggrieved party" who could properly appeal under New York's rules of civil procedure. 47 N.Y.2d at 627-28, 393 N.E.2d at 999,
419 N.Y.S.2d at 925, citing Grant v. Greene Consol. Copper Co., 169 A.D. 206, 215-16, 154
N.Y.S. 596, 603, aff'd, 223 N.Y. 655, 119 N.E. 1046 (1918). See N.Y. Civ. PRc. LAw § 5511
(McKinney 1978) (an "aggrieved party" may appeal from any appealable order). In support of
this holding, the court pointed out that the defendants had attempted to terminate Wallenstein's separate derivative suit on this cause of action on the ground that the case at bar was res
judicata. 47 N.Y.2d at 626, 393 N.E.2d at 998, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 925. See note 7 supra.
Along similar lines, the court rejected the defendants' argument that Wallenstein should have
intervened much earlier, ruling that a party should intervene only when 1) he might be adversely affected by a proceeding to which he is not a party, and 2) his interests are not being
adequately represented by the parties to the proceeding. Id. at 628, 393 N.E.2d at 999, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 925, citing N.Y. Cmv. PRAc. LAW §§ 1012-1013 (McKinney 1976); 7 J. WEINSTEIN,
H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
5511.04, at 68-69 (1979). According to
the court, Wallenstein's interests were being adequately represented until Auerbach decided he
did not wish to pursue the matter on appeal, at which time the intervenor's interests were
completely unrepresented. 47 N.Y.2d at 628, 393 N.E.2d at 999, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
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corporate directors exercised with honest judgment in furtherance of legitimate corporate purposes. 35 Judge Jones, writing for the majority, suggested
that courts are "ill equipped" to evaluate business judgments, essentially
because no objective standard exists by which a court could do so.36 "Thus,
absent bad faith or fraud," the decision whether and to what extent to pursue a derivative claim rests with the corporate board of directors. 37 The
court noted, however, that it is never foreclosed from inquiring into the
disinterested independence of the members of the committee chosen to
make the board's decision.38
Having concluded that the business judgment rule "shields the deliberations and conclusions ...only if [the directors] possess a disinterested
independence and do not stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudicial exercise of judgment," 39 the court considered whether the
committee possessed that independence, noting that to disqualify the entire
board would leave the corporation powerless to make a business judgment
regarding the prosecution of the derivative action. 4 0 In finding that the
committee's decisions were shielded by the business judgment rule, the court
recognized that an inherent conflict exists in allowing directors to investigate
fellow directors, but held that this conflict is an "inescapable, given aspect of
the corporation's predicament."' 4 1 Moreover, the court refused to allow
others to perform this investigatory function for the corporation, reasoning as
follows:
To assign responsibility of the dimension here involved to individuals wholly separate and apart from the board of directors
would, exce t in the most extraordinary circumstances, itself be an

act of default and breach of the nondelegable fiduciary duty owed
by the members of the board to the corporation and to its
shareholders, employees and creditors. For the courts to preside
over such determinations would similarly work an ouster of the
board's fundamental responsibility and authority for corporate
42
management.
35. 47 N.Y.2d at 629, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926. For an explanation of the

business judgment rule, see notes 12-16 and accompanying text supra.
36. 47 N.Y.2d at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926.
37. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
38. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
39. Id.Cf note 16 and accompanying text supra.
40. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. The court rejected Wallenstein's argument that any committee appointed by defendant directors must be held legally
infirm. Id. at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. Judge Jones noted that "[c]ourts
have consistently held that the business judgment rule applies where some directors are
charged with wrongdoing, so long as the remaining directors making the decision are disinterested." Id. at 632, 393 N.E.2d at 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928, citing Swanson v. Traer, 249
F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1957); Republic Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658, 668-69
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gall. v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Issner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696, 701-02 (D. Del. 1966); Gilbert v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 179 Misc.
641, 645, 38 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1942). For a discussion of Gall v. Exxon, see notes
26-29 and accompanying text supra. For discussion of the remaining cases, see note 24 supra.
41. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
42. Id. See notes 72-75 and accompanying text infra.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss3/7

8

Friedman: Corporations - The Business Judgment Rule Shields the Good Faith
1979-1980]

RECENT ]DEVELOPMENTS

Since the court found that the committee's deliberations were protected
by the business judgment rule, it limited its examination to a consideration
of the appropriateness of the committee's investigative procedures. 4 3 In
holding that the committee members may reasonably be required to prove
that they pursued their chosen investigative methods in good faith, and that
these methods were "reasonably complete," 4 4 the court added that the nature and extent of the evidentiary proof required would depend upon the
particular investigation, and that the extent of pretrial discovery by
shareholders would relate inversely to the extent of disclosure by the committee members.4 5 The court stated, however, that "what has been uncovered and the relative weight accorded in evaluating and balancing the sev46
eral factors and considerations are beyond the scope of judicial concern."
Qualifying this statement, the court noted that proof of a restricted, shallow,
or otherwise pro forma investigation would be evidence of bad faith or fraud
47
and, hence, would be unshielded by the business judgment doctrine.
Turning to the record, the court considered whether there was a triable
issue of fact concerning the adequacy or appropriateness of the committee's
investigative methods.4 8 Looking at the submissions made by the defendants in support of their motions for summary judgment, the court found
nothing in the record to indicate a triable issue of fact concerning the committee's procedures or the committee's good faith in carrying out those procedures. 4 9 Wallenstein suggested that a triable issue could only be raised if
he were permitted discovery. 50 The court refused to permit discovery

43. 47 N.Y.2d at 633, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928. Judge Jones cautioned that
the court may not trespass in the "domain of business judgment" under the guise of determining the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee's investigative procedures. Id. at 634,
393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
44. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The court did not elaborate as to
how one establishes good faith in pursuing an investigation. See notes 60-71 and accompanying
text infra.
45. 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 634-35, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. The court did not specify how
one can demonstrate a shallow investigation without being able to obtain and scrutinize the
committee's findings and deliberations. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra.
48. See 47 N.Y.2d at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
49. Id. at 635-36, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929-30. The committee engaged
former Chief Judge Desmond of the New York Court of Appeals as special counsel to "guide its
deliberations." 64 A.D.2d at 102, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87. The specific procedures used by the
committee were as follows:
The committee reviewed the prior work of the audit committee, testing its completeness, accuracy and thoroughness by interviewing representatives of Wilmer, Cutler &
Pickering, [the audit committee's special counsel from Washington, D.C.], reviewing
transcripts of the testimony of 10 corporate officers and employees before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and studying documents collected by and work papers of the
Washington law firm.
47 N.Y.2d at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929-30. Also, the committee conducted
individual interviews with the defendant directors and with representatives of Arthur Andersen
& Co., and questionnaires were solicited from each nonmanagement director of the corporation.
Id. at 635, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
50. 47 N.Y.2d at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
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reasoning that 1) Auerbach had not asked for discovery at the trial court
level; 2) there were no opposing affidavits (to summary judgment) indicating
to the court that essential facts might exist which could be obtained by
discovery; and 3) neither Wallenstein's brief nor oral argument identified
particulars as to which he desired discovery regarding the disinterested
independence of the committee or its methodology in pursuing its investi51
gation.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Cooke took the position that
summary judgment should be postponed pending discovery. 52 He recognized that continuation of the suit depended upon the motives and actions of
the defendants and the committee, and that knowledge of such matters was
"peculiarly in the possession of the defendants themselves." 53
The dissent
reasoned that Wallenstein was placed in a "Catch-22" situation by the majority which denied him discovery because he had not produced facts which, by
their very nature, were discernable only after discovery. 54 Chief Judge
Cooke concluded by suggesting that the majority's decision "may render
corporate directors largely unaccountable to the shareholders whose business
55
they are elected to govern."

51. 1d., 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930. The court noted that
the disclosure proposed . . . by Wallenstein . . . would go only to particulars as to the
results of the committee's investigation and work, the factors bearing on its substantive
decision not to prosecute the derivative actions and the factual aspects of the underlying
[allegedly illegal] activities of defendants-all matters falling within the ambit of the business judgment doctrine.
Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 636-38, 393 N.E.2d at 1004-05, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930-31 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
Chief Judge Cooke reasoned that this was not a typical business judgment rule case because the
directors were the alleged wrongdoers. Id. at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930
(Cooke, C.J., dissenting). Therefore, the Chief Judge concluded that "since certain defendants
as well as the members of the special litigation committee have the sole knowledge of the facts
upon which [the business judgment rule's] applicability turns, summary judgment should be
withheld pending disclosure proceedings." Id.
53. Id. at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting), quoting
Terranova v. Emil, 20 N.Y.2d 493, 496-97, 231 N.E.2d 753, 755, 285 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (1967).
Chief Judge Cooke found the lower appellate court's opinion extremely persuasive. 47 N.Y.2d at
636, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). That lower court had
suggested that "the depth and amplitude of the investigation and the emphasis placed by the
committee on the various factors necessarily to be considered" were proper subjects for judicial
scrutiny. 64 A.D.2d at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88. According to the lower court, the factors
likely to be considered would include the reasons for the payments, the benefits to the corporation resulting from the payments, the personal gain by the defendant directors, and the loss of
public confidence in the corporation which might be caused by the derivative suit. Id. Unlike
the majority of the New York Court of Appeals, the lower court believed "the hesitancy which
might arise in outside directors by their investigation of the activities of fellow directors, especially when personal liability is at stake, [to be] a consideration of moment." Id. at 107, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 88 (footnote omitted).
The lower court opinion also expressed doubts as to the applicability of the business judgment doctrine in a situation where obvious conflicts of interest exist. Id. "[S]ummary judgment
which ends a derivative action . . . before . . . pretrial discovery . . . should not be the means
of foreclosing a nonfrivolous action." Id. at 107-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
54. 47 N.Y.2d at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004-05, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 638, 393 N.E.2d at 1005, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
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It is submitted that, as a matter of judicial expediency, the notion that
honest, disinterested, independent directors, acting in good faith, should be
able to decide not to pursue a suit against the majority of the directors is not
without merit. 56 It is contended, however, that the Auerbach court's application of this principle suffers from two major inconsistencies. First, after
noting that it is never foreclosed from inquiring into the disinterested inde-

pendence of the committee members, 57 the court failed to probe deeply into
that very subject, apparently because it simply relied upon the reputations
58
Second, it
of the three new directors and the committee's special counsel.
is submitted that the court practically avoided considering the good faith
requirement of the business judgment rule-even after admitting that evidence of bad faith or 59fraud would be sufficient to overcome the business
judgment justification.
With respect to the requirement of proving good faith, it is suggested
6°
Signifthat the Auerbach court contradicted itself in several respects.
icantly, the court noted that the adequacy and appropriateness of the com61
mittee's investigative procedures were proper subjects of inquiry, and that
the committee may reasonably be required to prove that they pursued their
chosen investigative methods in good faith and with reasonable completeness. 62 Yet, it is submitted that the court proceeded to eliminate a potentially fruitful area of inquiry, stating that it was not permitted to consider the

facts revealed by the committee's investigation or the relative weight accorded to them by the committee. 63 While the court seemingly qualified
56. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra. Concerning the dilemma which a court faces
in considering a management group's refusal to sue, one commentator has suggested:
The usual ties between all members of a management group may and perhaps should
induce a court to view [a decision not to sue] with a degree of skepticism and prompt
[I]t is easy to
directors ....
scrutiny as to the true motives of the "independent" ...
appreciate the dilemma of courts faced with the choice, on the one hand, of a prophylactic rule that holds the erosion of moral precept, attending a fraudulent fiduciary's escape
from liability, too high a price to pay for peace in any case, and on the other, of a rule
that makes narrow corporate interest, primarily financial, as determined by the judgment
of presumably independent directors, preeminent.
M. FEUER, PERSONAL LIABILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 196 (1961).
57. 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. See text accompanying note
38 supra.
58. 47 N.Y.2d at 631-32, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. See notes 4 & 49 and
accompanying text supra.
59. 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. See notes 37-40 & 44-47
and accompanying text supra; notes 60-66 and accompanying text infra.
60. See notes 61-66 and accompanying text infra.
61. 47 N.Y.2d at 633-34, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29. See notes 43-45 and
accompanying text supra.
62. 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
63. 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that if the directors ignored very significant investigative
results or began the investigation with a predetermined resolve that the damaging publicity
factor would outweigh all else, a factfinder might justifiably infer bad faith. Moreover, it is
submitted that the court's suggestion that bad faith can only be an element of the methodology
of an investigation is unrealistic at best. A thorough investigation does not automatically guarantee that a decision was made in good faith. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text infra.
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the latter statement by positing that proof of a "shallow" or "pro forma"
investigation would raise questions of bad faith or even fraud,6 4 the court
failed to suggest how one could demonstrate a sham without considering the
bases for the committee's decision. 65 As a result, it is suggested that as long
as a committee goes through the motions of a thorough investigation, 6 6 there
can never be proof of' "shallowness" and the committee will not be accountable to anyone, even though its conclusions may be totally inappropriate in
light of the information gained.
It is further suggested that the majority's refusal to allow discovery on
the ground that Wallenstein had not produced evidence sufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact concerning the committee's decision 67 has created an
almost impossible burden of proof for the complaining shareholder to
meet. 68 It is submitted that it is very difficult to challenge the
"disinterestedness" of the committee members or to produce evidence of
bad faith without being permitted to examine and use the substance and
reasoning behind the committee's decision. 69 By its very nature, this evidence can only be obtained through discovery. 70 It is contended that the
more reasonable view is that expressed by Justice Hopkins, who, while writing for the unanimous majority in the court below, suggested that discovery
should be permitted, and, if the record then shows "that the disinterest of
the directors was not refuted, the underlying facts were thoroughly investi-

It has been contended that where a possible conflict of interest exists, the burden of proof
regarding good faith should be shifted to the board. See Note, supra note 12, at 572. The
Auerbach court did shift the burden in the instant case, but it only required that the methodology of the committee indicate good faith. 47 N.Y.2d at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002-03, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 929.
64. See 47 N.Y.2d at 634-35, 393 N.E.2d at 1003, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929; note 47 and accompanying text supra.
65. It is suggested that excellent proof of a sham is a decision totally contrary to investigative results. The court, however, refused to probe into the results. See note 70 infra.
66. See note 47 supra.
67. 47 N.Y.2d at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1003-04, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930. See notes 50-51 and
accompanying text supra.
68. See 47 N.Y.2d at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004-05, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). It should be noted that the court, in allowing intervention nunc pro tunc, could have
properly constrained Wallenstein at oral argument by limiting him to the record below, but
laudably chose not to do so. Id. at 628-29, 393 N.E.2d at 999, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 925. It is
therefore submitted that this decision is not an anomoly created by Wallenstein's unusual procedural posture. The fact that the court seemed willing to allow Wallenstein to make arguments
not raised by Auerbach, coupled with the court's restrictions concerning the scope of discovery,
see text accompanying note 51 supra, leads to the conclusion that Wallenstein was not prejudiced by the fact that his intervention occurred at a late stage in the proceedings.
69. See note 53 and accompanying text supra; notes 71-75 and accompanying text infra.
70. See 47 N.Y.2d at 637, 393 N.E.2d at 1004-05, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). As a practical matter, discovery will not be necessary if the committee discloses the
bases for its decision. A refusal to disclose such information is, it is submitted, contrary to the
notion that the directors acted in good faith, and should prompt a court to allow discovery. As
Chief Judge Cooke's dissent pointed out, when knowledge of the facts is in the exclusive possession of the committee, discovery should be permitted to discern these facts. Id. at 637, 393
N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 931 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). See note 53 and accompanying
text supra.
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gated and cogent reasons existed in support of the decision of the commit71
tee," the suit should be dismissed.
Finally, in response to the majority's argument that more extensive
scrutiny of the committee's decision by the courts than that allowed in the
instant case would usurp the board's "fundamental responsibility" to the corporation, 7 2 an additional point ought to be raised. It is submitted that courts
should not consider themselves to be so tightly constrained by the business
judgment rule in examining charges of wrongdoing leveled against a corporation's directors. 73 The mere fact that courts are willing to let "disinterested" directors decide the issue of whether to sue other directors does
not mandate that the courts be precluded from using the substance of an
investigation to test the good faith of those directors. 74 Indeed, the very
question before the courts is whether directors are capable of exercising
their "fundamental responsibility" to the corporation when close personal or
business relationships may be involved. 75 Undoubtedly, the substance of
the committee's work can be an enlightening source of evidence regarding
this question.
Turning to the impact of this decision, it is submitted that the New
York Court of Appeals, by giving the absolute power to the board of directors to terminate a derivative suit if it so chooses, has approved a method
which will most assuredly reduce the number of such suits in New York.
Moreover, if enough derivative suits against directors are quashed by committees of "disinterested" directors, truly meritorious causes of action may
not be pursued because attorneys, very often the chief beneficiaries of a
derivative action, will refuse to waste their time and effort on potentially
76
fruitless lawsuits.
71. 64 A.D.2d at 108, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88 (emphasis added). There is no intention to imply
that "'cogent reasons" did not exist in the instant case to support the committee's decision.
Rather, it is suggested that the holding in this case creates a dangerous precedent by preempting judicial inquiry into the possibility that cogent reasons might not exist. See also Lasker v.
Burks, 404 F. Supp. at 1181; note 31 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
73. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 64 A.D.2d at 107-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88. The Appellate
Division reasoned as follows:
The business judgment doctrine should not be interpreted to stifle legitimate scrutiny
by stockholders of decisions of management which, concededly, require investigation by
outside directors and present ostensible situations of conflict of interest. Nor should the
report of the outside directors be immune from scrutiny by an interpretation of the doctrine which compels the acceptance of the findings of the report on their face ...
In short, the business judgment rule should not be so rigorously applied as to cut
short . . . apparently legitimate inquiry into a nonfrivolous claim of wrongdoing by directors . . . on the ground that a committee of disinterested directors . . . decided that the
corporate interests will not be promoted by a derivative action.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted). The opinion of the Appellate Division was adopted by the
dissent in the instant case. See 47 N.Y.2d at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930
(Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
74. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
75. See notes 53 & 73 supra.
76. Since it is the corporation which will recover in a derivative action, the individual
shareholder usually will not stand to gain direct monetary benefits, but his lawyer may lay claim
to substantial attorney's fees. See generally 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE
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It is suggested that another noteworthy effect of Auerbach is that the
New York Court of Appeals has effectively eliminated any exceptions to the
requirement that demand be made on the board of directors. 77 After Auerbach, as long as the bylaws of the corporation contain a provision for socalled "executive committees" to be created by the board, 78 "interested"
directors will be able to form a committee of "disinterested" directors having
the power to terminate a derivative suit. 79 Thus, it must be concluded that
demand can never be futile since, even if the entire board of directors is
accused of wrongdoing, only three directors 80 need resign to allow substitution of enough disinterested committee members to require that demand be made. 8 1 It is submitted that if such is the case, directors will
always be able to use this technique to attempt to quash a derivative suit
8 2
and, in the majority of cases, they will prevail.
The decision of the litigation committee in the instant suit may very
well have been proper and made in good faith. It is submitted, however,
that the precedent established by this case does a disservice to the corporate
system by rubber-stamping a technique which potentially allows directors'
decisions made in bad faith and totally contrary to investigative results to
§ 732 (Supp. 1968); Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, .66
HARv. L. REV. 849 (1975).

77. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. As long as disinterested directorships can
be created, it does not seem possible for a situation to arise in which it would be futile to make
a demand. See notes 78-81 and accompanying text infra. It is submitted that the Auerbach
decision makes the demand requirement exception of Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 329
N.E.2d 180, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975), an aberration easily avoidable by use of the technique
employed in this case. See notes 21-23 and accompanying text supra.
78. Cf. note 29 supra.
79. See N.Y. Bus. Coup. LAW § 712(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). New York authorizes such
committees and empowers them to exercise "all the authority of the board." Id.
80. See id. The New York Business Corporations Law requires at least three members to
form a committee. Id.
81. Id. § 705(a). Section 705(a) provides in pertinent part:
Vacancies . . . may be filled by vote of the board. If the number of directors then in office
is less than a quorum, such . . . vacancies may be filled by a vote of a majority of the
directors then in office. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect any provision of the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws which provide that . . . vacancies shall be filled by
vote of the shareholders.
Id. Strategically, directors would desire to avoid a bylaw provision requiring shareholders to fill
vacancies on the board. This would eliminate the possibility that persons hostile to the present
board members would fill the vacancies.
82. One possible situation might arise in which a derivative suit could not be terminated. At
least one court has held that where the decision not to bring suit perpetuates an illegal act, the
cause of action must be pursued. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir.
1974) (failure to collect a debt constituted an unlawful campaign contribution); note 28 supra. If
such a distinction is meritorious, it is submitted that Auerbach would be decided differently
today on the basis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd 1-2 (Supp. 1979),
which makes bribes illegal. Thus, a failure to sue by the board of directors to recover a "debt"
owed by a foreign official would perpetuate an illegal act. However, if the directors did not
accept kickbacks or bribes, but instead, were involved only in giving bribes, a decision not to
sue the directors for the corporate asset would not seem to be illegal. In Miller, by forcing the
directors to sue for the debt, the court prevented the illegal act (the contribution) from being
consummated. 507 F.2d at 763. In a bribery situation, only suing the bribed official would truly
rectify the illegality in a similar fashion by preventing the official from keeping the money.
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hide behind the judicially constructed shield of the business judgment
rule.83

Jeff J. Friedman

83. It is arguable that the availability of this technique could persuade corporations habitually troubled by frivolous suits to reincorporate in New York. An even more unfortunate result
may be that other states will follow Auerbach and insulate corporate directors in a similar
fashion. Indeed, some federal courts have already followed the Auerbach rationale in cases
applying state law. See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying California
law); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (purportedly applying Delaware law), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3436 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,260 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1980) (purportedly applying
Delaware law). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, No. 4800 (Del. Ch., Mar. 18, 1980) (shareholder
has an absolute right to bring a derivative suit against directors).
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